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Abstract 
In the lab, we examine the effectiveness of two land use conservation policies: a tradable 
set aside requirements (TSARs), and the TSARs combined with an agglomeration bonus.  
Evaluated by bioeconomic efficiency, our experimental results suggest: 1) TSARs is a 
cost-effective land conservation tool; and 2) combining TSARS with the agglomeration 
bonus increases habitat connectivity but at a price—lower economic efficiency.     
 
 
 
 
* Thanks to the USDA, and the UW Stroock and Bugas funds for partial financial 
support.  Shogren thanks the Norwegian University of Life Sciences for their support 
while working on this project.  Additional thanks to Travis Warziniack and students at 
the University of Wyoming for insightful comments and discussions.  
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Introduction 
 
 Protecting biological diversity and ecosystem services remains a key element of 
21
st
 Century government regulation (see e.g., Barbier, 2011).  Numerous government 
programs around the globe have been implemented to control or influence public and 
private land uses (Langpap and Wu, 2004; Crepin, 2005; Feng et al., 2006; Clement and 
Amezaga, 2009; Henger and Bizer, 2010; Bullock and King, 2011).   In the United States, 
for instance, federal policies such as the National Environmental Policy Act, Farm Bills, 
the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act all place regulatory requirements 
on land use practices.  The regulations imposed by these policies extend across both 
private and public lands as do the majority of the resources these federal policies are 
designed to protect.  Not surprisingly, the political opposition against implementation of 
these policies differs, however, depending on whether the policy affects private and 
public lands—private landowners complain loudly when public policy restricts their land 
use decisions (see, e.g., Smith and Shogren, 2002).   
While the costs of meeting regulatory constraints on public lands are incurred by 
society, private landowners pick up the tab to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services 
on private lands.  These private landowners have incentive to avoid the costs of land use 
regulations; for example, they can alter land attributes to have less conservation value 
prior to the imposition of regulatory constraints (Innes et al., 1998).   This can result in 
less conservation at greater cost to achieve regulatory goals (see Ando et al, 1998; 
Dreschler and Watzold, 2001; Hartig and Drechsler, 2009; Hamaide and Sheerin, 2010).   
Economists and practitioners have long argued that positive incentives are needed 
to induce landowners to cooperate with regulatory protection of ecosystem services 
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(Bean, 1998; Shogren et al., 1999; Adler, 2008).   Positive incentives take on many forms 
(e.g., taxes, subsidies; see Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002).  
Tradable development rights (TDR) is a key incentive system proposed for efficiency 
properties (Innes et al., 1998; Thornes and Simons, 1998; Boyd et al., 2000).  For a TDR 
policy, a regulator sets the maximum amount of allowed development, allocates TDRs to 
landowners, and then allows a market to exist so buyers and sellers can reallocate TDRs 
such that the property with the lowest opportunity cost remains undeveloped.    
One of the initial tradable development scheme was implemented in New York 
City and allowed for neighboring landowners to trade building density (Renard, 2007).  
Adjoining landowners can combine their allowed floor area while maintaining separate 
property ownership, provided the aggregate floor area for both buildings does not exceed 
the zoned maximum amount of floor area of the two properties.  A developer can increase 
the buildings allowed density by purchasing the unused floor area of an adjacent 
landowner.  
The TDR program can work for economic efficiency by transferring development 
rights from low value areas to high value areas; but has two primary weaknesses when 
we consider biological efficiency: 1) low land development values are imperfectly 
correlated with high conservation values.  The land conserved will be the lowest 
development valued land but it might not be the land desired for the valuable ecosystem 
services; and 2) conserved parcels may not be located spatially to create the contiguous 
habitat and land corridors that create positive biological network externalities.  
Networking conserved parcels may reduce the cost of conservation as fewer parcels are 
needed to meet the regulatory objective (Ando et al., 1998; Parkhurst and Shogren, 
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2008).   To overcome these shortcomings, a regulator should design the TDR incentive 
mechanism to have two components: one focused on retiring land, and a second that 
creates the desired spatial configuration.   
Two mechanisms have been proposed that combine TDRs and a spatial 
component.  First, Mills (1980) proposed combining a TDR policy with zoning to deal 
with the imperfect spatial correlation between development values and conservation 
values.  A government regulator first determines the area desired for conservation (the 
―sending zone‖), severs the right to develop, and then allocates TDR to the landowners 
within the sending zone.  TDRs are sold through a market instrument.
1
   The problem 
with Mills’ mechanism is it negates the least cost aspect of a TDR policy.  Instead the 
method relegates TDRs to be just a compensatory tool in a landscape in which the 
regulator chooses winners and losers.  In addition, implementing a TDR with zoning 
mechanism is expensive for local jurisdictions which may prove cost prohibitive given 
economic circumstances (see Henger and Bizer, 2010).  
Second, Drechsler and Watzold (2009) introduced an algorithm for a TDR 
program that incorporates the spatial component within the biodiversity measurement 
mechanism.  The mechanism accounts for the biodiversity network externalities created 
through the location of conserved land within the landscape and determine the amount of 
                                                 
1
 The most illustrative application of a TDR scheme is the Pinelands National Preserve in New Jersey 
which was established in 1978 to protect the environment.   In 1980 a comprehensive management plan 
was approved.  The plan delineated the 4,000 square kilometers of densely populated forested expanse into 
10 categories with differing zoning ordinances.  Some categories were designated as areas where 
development was not permitted but able to transfer development rights, while other categories allowed for 
varying degrees of development in conjunction with the purchase of a development right.  The amount of 
developmental rights transferable from a development restricted area was dependent upon that areas 
environmental value.  For example, one development credit was awarded for every 16 hectares of the core 
conservancy area, or for each 32 hectares of wetlands, or for each 8 hectares of agricultural land.  A 
developer required 4 development credits to build a home in an area where development was permitted 
(See Renard, 2007).    
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development a landowner can trade contingent upon the location of the conserved 
parcels.  They conclude that the TDR algorithm is effective provided the development 
values of the land maintain some correlation below a critical randomness measure.  Two 
issues with their incentive mechanism stand out: 1) information and technical needs to 
understand the impact of spatial location of conserved land on a landowners available 
TDR are likely beyond landowners cognitive abilities and costly for the regulator to 
provide on a per landowner basis (an issue magnified in a dynamic setting); and 2) 
coordination across landowners is challenging due to different expectations and risk 
preferences.  Their TDR policy is likely too complex to be implemented without 
significant and costly oversight.     
Herein we propose a third incentive mechanism to combine tradable permits and 
spatial incentives.   We create a system that combines a tradable set-aside requirement 
(TSARs) with an agglomeration bonus to meet spatial conservation objectives at least 
cost (see Parkhurst and Crocker, 2002; and Parkhurst et al., 2002).  A regulator 
determines the number of land parcels necessary to meet spatial conservation objectives 
and then allocates set-aside requirements proportionally to the landowners.  Each set 
aside obligates the possessing landowner to conserve one parcel of land.  The regulator 
creates a market that facilitates trade that moves conservation to the low cost parcels.  To 
induce the desired configuration the regulator pays the landowners an agglomeration 
bonus for each border shared between two conserved parcels (Parkhurst et al., 2002).  
The agglomeration bonus induces the landowners to coordinate their conserved parcels 
into contiguous habitat reserves.  The agglomeration bonus can be structured to satisfy 
numerous spatial configurations (see Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; 2008).   
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We design a lab experiment to testbed the two-part TSARs with agglomeration 
bonus mechanism; we compare our two-part mechanism to a TSARs-only policy and a 
benchmark command and control approach that forces each landowner to conserve an 
equal amount of land.  Comparing the results over economic and biological measures of 
efficiency, we find that TSARs is a cost-effective land conservation tool.  Additionally, 
combining TSARS with the agglomeration bonus increases biological efficiency (habitat 
connectivity) but at a price—lower economic efficiency.     
 
Experimental Design 
 
Our experimental design had six structural elements—1) treatments; 2) players, 
positioning, and the land grid; 3) subsidies, strategies, and calculator; 4) tradable set-
aside requirements (TSARs) market and predictions; 5) communication, information and 
history, and 6) procedures.  Consider each in turn.   
Treatments.  Three institutional structures were tested—no trade (NT), trade only 
(TO), and trade with an agglomeration bonus (TAB).  In the NT treatment, each person 
was allocated 5 conservation set-aside requirements.  People were forced to conserve one 
parcel of land to satisfy each conservation set-aside requirement.  Similarly, in the TO 
treatment each landowner was allocated 5 set-aside requirements for which one cell must 
be conserved to satisfy the regulatory constraint.  A market was now constructed in 
which people could trade their set-aside requirements.  In this treatment, TSARs are seen 
as a liability—a landowner must forego productivity on one parcel of land to satisfy the 
TSAR, and as such requires the recipient of the TSAR to be compensated.   
The TAB treatment was identical to the TO treatment except that people now 
could receive an additional payment—the agglomeration bonus—for each border shared 
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between two of their own conserved parcels.  This agglomeration bonus has three 
impacts:(i) it creates a network externality between own conserved parcels; (ii) by setting 
the agglomeration bonus to exceed the opportunity cost of conservation the 
agglomeration bonus changes participants perception of TSARs.  TSARs are now seen as 
an asset as opposed to a liability; (iii) because TSARs with the agglomeration bonus is 
seen as an asset, participants will voluntary engage in the conservation program. We 
conducted two sessions of each institutional structure. Each session had 20 rounds.   
Number of participants, positioning, and land grid.  Participants.  Eight subjects 
participated in each session.  They were told they would be randomly assigned to a group 
of four subjects.  The group of four participants and each participant’s placement within 
the land grid would remain fixed for the remainder of the experiment.  Positioning.  We 
chose fixed groupings and fixed placements to provide participants consistency and they 
can apply past experience to present actions.  Grid.  In Figure 1 notice the 10X10 land 
grid and the positions of each participant within the land grid.  Each participant knew 
they owned a 5x5 portion of the 10x10 grid, and could identify where their portion was 
located relative to the rest of the land grid.  The values of each participant’s 25 cells 
ranged from $20 to $50, with no two participants having identical grid values.  The value 
in each cell represents the productive value of that cell.  Grid values for all four positions 
were common knowledge and participants had a specification page that delineated grid 
holdings and showed the land values for the entire 10x10 grid.   
  Subsidies, Strategies, and Calculator.  In the NT and TO treatments no subsidies 
existed—the costs of conservation were levied on the participants.  In the TAB treatment, 
participants earned an additional $50 payment for each border shared between two of 
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their own retired cells—shifting the costs of conservation from the participant to the 
experiment monitor (proxy regulator).  Strategies.  Participants were instructed that they 
could leave their cells green, in which case they earned the value in the cell, or they could 
brown out cells, which mean they earn the applicable subsidies but forego the value of 
the cell.  Each subject was required (allowed for the TAB treatment) to ―brown out‖ 5 
cells.  Note the large set of potential strategy set.  By presenting participants with the land 
grid and requiring participation the participants have 53,130 potential strategies.
2
    But in 
the TO and TAB treatments, the acquisition and remittance of TSARs changes the 
number of possible strategies.  For the NT and TO treatments, each participant has a 
dominant strategy of conserving their 5 lowest valued cells.  In the TAB treatment, the 
participant’s dominant strategy is to conserve the lowest cost cells that maximize 
agglomeration dollars.   
Calculator.  To help in the subjects calculate profits a grid calculator was 
provided on the computer screen.  The grid calculator was a 10x10 grid of cells with 
borders to differentiate each player’s portion of the section.  The participant’s portion of 
the calculator was tied directly to his 5x5 grid and reflected the choices made on the 5x5 
grid, meaning if a participant clicked on a cell in his grid, changing the color from green 
to brown, the same cell turned brown on the calculator.  For the other participants 
portions of the calculator the subject clicked the cells directly.  The participant’s own 
potential profits, based on the configuration of brown cells on the calculator, were 
calculated and displayed on the computer screen.   
                                                 
2
 See Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) for an example of similar calculations of the potential strategy set when 
considering the agglomeration bonus incentive scheme.   
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Tradable Set-Aside Requirements (TSARs) Market and Predictions.  Participants 
were provided with an auction window that facilitated trade in brown out cell 
requirements (or TSARs).  They were informed they could be buyers or sellers and were 
allowed to submit both bids and asks.  Further, they were informed that prices could be 
positive, negative, or zero and the implications of positive and negative prices were 
discussed.  Participants were told all prices must be in whole integers and that they would 
have 7 minutes to make trades.  The auction window allowed them to make bids or asks 
for individual units or for multiple units—a separate bid (ask) could be made for each 
quantity of TSARs up to the maximum individual holdings.  This feature was important 
in the TAB treatment in which the agglomeration bonus created a sticky market when 
only single unit trading was allowed (purchase of the TSAR increases the bidders shared 
borders by one but diminishes the sellers shared borders by two).   
Market Predictions.  As an upper benchmark, our market predictions assume a 
best-case scenario—three transactions occur, one transaction between each participant 
and the position 2 participant, and of course the low cost land is conserved.  The 
predicted quantity traded in the TSARs treatment is 14.  Acquisition of TSARs was to the 
position 2 participant with the position 1 and position 3 participants each trading 5 brown 
out cell requirements (TSARs) and the position 4 participants packaging 4 TSARs.  
Predicted market price is all whole integers in the interval of -$28.00 to -$40.00 [-$28, -
29,…, -39, -40].3  For the TAB treatment, predicted quantity was 15, with the position 2 
participant acquiring 5 TSARs from each of the other participants.  Predicted market 
price is [$10, 11, 12,…, 56, 57, 58].   
                                                 
3
 The range of market prices is determined as the average price per TSAR for the seller on the lower bound 
and the average price per TSAR for the buyer on the upper bound. 
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Communication, Information, and History.  Communication.  Participants were 
also provided the opportunity to communicate one message per round.  Communication 
was non-binding, unstructured with no restrictions on timing or content, and in which a 
common language was implemented by allowing subjects to send messages in their 
natural language (Crawford, 1998).  Participants had seven minutes to send messages, 
make trades and use the calculator, and send their choices.
4
  Information.  After all four 
participant’s choices were submitted the resulting grid was presented to the group.  They 
had common knowledge regarding payoffs and strategies.  History.  The entire 10x10 
grid showing the configuration of brown cells and the payoffs for each subject within the 
group then appeared in the history box.  They were also provided with record sheets to 
further help them keep track of their own and the other group members’ choice of 
strategies and associated payoffs in previous rounds.   
Procedures.  All experiments were on computers.  Participants were not told the 
objective of the experiment and all wording in the instructions and on the computer 
screens were context free.  Following standard protocol, the participants were recruited 
campus wide and were told to report at a computer lab at a given time.  Experimental 
instructions were provided to each participants and the monitor read them out loud. See 
Appendix A for the exact instructions. Participants were given an opportunity to ask 
questions concerning the experimental procedures, which were answered by the monitor. 
The monitor also walked the participants through two practice rounds to familiarize them 
with the experimental design. The monitor handed out the agglomeration bonus 
                                                 
4
 The seven-minute time period for sending messages and making decisions was timed manually.  The 
experimenter used a clock and informed students when there were 90 seconds remaining, 60 seconds 
remaining, 30 seconds remaining, and then when 0 seconds remained.  When the seven-minutes were up, 
participants who had not yet sent their actions were asked to do so at that time.  Participants always 
complied.  
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specification page, which participants were allowed to review.  The participants then 
entered their name and student identification number into the computer, and the computer 
randomly assigned them to groups of four.   
 
Results 
 
 We examine the experimental results in two steps—1) we present an illustrative 
example for one group from each of the three treatments; and 2) we discuss the group 
outcomes based on several measures of bioeconomic efficiency: biological efficiency, 
economical efficiency, cost efficiency, and spatial efficiency.  Consider each in turn. 
Illustrative Example    
Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate the actual outcomes for one group in each of the three 
compensation mechanisms.  In Figure 1 the NT mechanism is presented.  Here we see 
individuals conserved cells are distributed in random patterns.  In early rounds the two 
players in the bottom part of the grid, positions 2 and 4, are not conserving their least 
expensive parcels, and are therefore playing dominated strategies.  By round 6 and 
thereafter all four individuals are playing their dominant strategies.  Note, conserved 
parcels are seldom connected across individuals, and, the group never obtains the 
maximum level of connectivity.  Figure 3 illustrates a group outcome for the TO 
treatment.  Here, the participant in position 2 plays a dominated strategy in rounds 1-7 
and 9.  The position 2 participant can increase earnings through a simple reallocation of 
his TSARs.  In rounds 8 and 10-20 the position 2 participant plays his dominant 
strategy—no reallocation of TSARs can increase his earnings.  The position 4 participant 
plays his dominant strategy in rounds 2-19, while positions 1 and 3 play their dominant 
strategies in every round.  Also, as the experiment progresses, the position 2 participant is 
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able to increase his inventory of TSARs through trade.  In rounds 18 and 19 the group is 
able to achieve the group outcome that results in the greatest economic returns for the 
group.   However, because TSARs, alone, does not create incentives to link conserved 
parcels, maximum payoffs do not imply maximum connectivity.  Rather, for TSARs, 
maximum payoffs imply the minimum productive land is conserved.   
Finally, turning to group outcomes for TAB in Figure 3, we see the participant in 
position 2 played his dominant strategy in rounds 2-20.  The participant in position 4 
played dominated strategies whenever he failed to trade away his TSARs—rounds 1, 3-6, 
9, 13, and 18.  The participant in positions 1 played a dominated strategy in rounds 2-6, 
and 20 because he failed to capture the maximum number of agglomeration bonus 
dollars—a reallocation of conservation would yield an increase in own shared borders 
and associated subsidy dollars.  The position 3 participant played his dominant strategy in 
every round. As expected, an increase in TSARs through trade tended towards the 
position 2 participant.  In round 16, maximum economic earnings and connectivity are 
achieved.  Adding the agglomeration bonus with TSARs provided the proper incentives 
for individuals to minimize the fragmentation of their joint conservation efforts.   
Bioeconomic Efficiency 
To better understand how our results relate to conservation targets, we evaluate 
the success of the compensation mechanisms by cost efficiency, economic efficiency, 
biological efficiency, and spatial efficiency.  Cost efficiency (CE) is the ratio of actual 
foregone productivity to the minimum foregone productivity: CE = Group foregone 
productivity/540.  Economic efficiency (EE) is the percentage of available program rents 
earned by the group: EE = (Group earnings – min earnings)/(max earnings – min 
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earnings).
5
  Biological efficiency (BE) is a gradient measure—the percentage of the 
shared borders between conserved parcels achieved by the group to the maximum 
number of shared borders.
6
  Finally, spatial efficiency (SE) is the percentage of predicted 
cells that are actually conserved.     
We use a Spearman’s Rho rank correlation test to establish the independent set of 
observations within group.  The Spearman Rho uses the combination of round and 
outcome to determine correlation (or lack thereof) across rounds (see Conover, 1999).
7
  
We use a Smirnov test of equal distributions to establish dependence between group 
outcomes within treatment.  The Smirnov test is an appropriate test because the two 
samples are random, mutually exclusive, values are ordinal, and the random variables are 
continuous.  The Smirnov test allows for the comparison of the distributions of values of 
two random samples.
8
  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the set of 
independent observations.   
Cost Efficiency.  From Table 1 observe CE averages 128% of the minimum 
possible cost ($540) in the NT treatment, 112% of $540 in the TO treatment, and for 
TAB, 113% of minimum cost.  Using a two-tail Mann-Whitney test, we test if CE is 
invariant to treatment type.  We reject the null hypotheses between the NT and TO 
treatments (p < 0.001), the TAB treatment and the NT treatment (p < 0.001), and we 
reject the null hypothesis at 11% significance for the TO and TAB treatments (p = 0.11).  
                                                 
5
 Maximum and minimum earnings depend on the institutional structure of the incentive mechanism, which 
differ across treatments.  EE is an indicator of the ability of groups to earn the maximum available rents.  
6
 We use Figure 3 to clarify the BE gradient.  In round 1, 28 of a maximum 31 borders are shared between 
conserved parcels, implying BE = 90.3%.  In round 3, BE = 71.0% (22 of 31 borders shared).  In round 16, 
BE = 100% (31 of 31 borders shared).  
7
 For independence within group observations, we limit the sample to the subset of consecutive rounds for 
which independence cannot be rejected at the 10% level or better.  See Appendix B.    
8
 We follow a rule:  a group that has a different distribution from all three of the other group distributions 
cannot be an identical distribution and as such the data is omitted from the sample. 
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As expected, TSARs effectively reduces the cost of conservation.  Adding the 
agglomeration bonus to TSARs increases the cost of foregone productivity relative to a 
TSARs only policy, because, now to create a contiguous habitat patch some more 
expensive land must be placed in conservation.  Result 1 summarizes our findings. 
Result 1.  Allowing individuals to trade in the requirements of conserving land reduces 
the opportunity cost of conservation.  However, the addition of incentives to achieve a 
secondary objective—an agglomeration bonus to induce the creation of a contiguous 
conservation reserve—to a TSARs Policy increases the private cost of foregone 
productivity over tradable permits only, but is still less costly than the No TSARs policy.  
         
Biological Efficiency.  For BE, Table 1 shows the NT treatment achieves 38%, the TO 
treatment 72%, and 84% for the TAB treatment.  The null hypotheses of equal means are 
rejected at the 1% level for comparisons between NT and TAB and TO and TAB, and 
rejected at the 5% significance level for NT and TO.  The introduction of a TSARs policy 
and the subsequent market in conservation improves BE.  Adding an additional incentive 
mechanism, the agglomeration bonus, designed to coordinate conservation efforts within 
the landscape and create contiguous habitat reserve further improves BE.  Note, the 
improvement in BE between NT and TO treatments is largely a result of the experimental 
construct.  If the spatial allocation of low development valued land was less correlated, so 
that trade results in an offset in connectivity, it is conceivable that no differences in BE 
would be evident between the NT and TO treatments.  Result 2 summarizes our findings.    
Result 2.  In a landscape similar to the grid representation—low valued land is spatially 
correlated, allowing trade in conservation set-aside requirements results in net gains in 
Biological Efficiency. Combining TSARs with an Agglomeration Bonus improves 
Biological Efficiency; with the impact being greatest as low development value land is 
less spatially correlated.   
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Economic Efficiency.  Our measure of economic efficiency is best characterized 
as a measure of the ability of participants to comprehend the institution.  Turning to Table 
1 we see EE is 100% for the NT treatment, 67% EE in the TO treatment, and 84% in the 
TAB treatment.  Pairwise comparisons using the Mann-Whitney test indicates the null 
hypotheses of equal means can be rejected at the 1% significance level for comparisons 
between the NT and TO treatments and the NT and TAB treatments, and at the 5% 
significance level between the TO and TAB treatments.  EE is greatest in the NT 
treatment in which economic efficiency requires people to conserve their low cost land.  
Once trade was introduced, where potential gains from trade increases the size of the pie, 
EE decreased.  Though some gains were realized as evidenced by the decrease in CE, 
individuals were unable to extract all of the rents from the market.  EE improved with the 
introduction of the agglomeration bonus to the TSARs policy, because now the portion of 
earnings that are attributed to gains from trade are less than half of the total gains 
resulting from this two part incentive scheme (59% of gains can be earned prior to trade 
with the efficient spatial allocation of TSARs).  We summarize in the following result.    
Result 3.  The addition of a market, which requires people to interact effectively to 
extract maximum earnings, results in net social gains; however, the market also 
increases the money left on the table.  The percent of rents not captured decreases when 
the agglomeration bonus is added to a TSARs policy. 
         
Spatial Efficiency.  From Table 1 we see SE is 71% for TO and 63% for TAB.  
Using a Mann Whitney test we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal means.  The 
probability of allocating conserved parcels (and TSARs) to the spatial area that provides 
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the lowest cost is not statistically different.  Note, on average two more TSARs are traded 
to the low cost land.
9
  
Result 4.  The final after trade distribution of TSARs to the low cost landowner is not 
different regardless if people see TSARs as a liability or an asset.  
      
 
Concluding comment 
 
 The success of tradable pollution permit programs at meeting air quality standards 
for regional air pollutants at minimum cost has encourage policy makers and academics 
to find ways of creating marketable instruments that can be readily applied to land uses 
(see e.g., Stavins, 1998).  Limits do exist, however, in transferring the idea of the 
standard tradable air pollution permit policy to control land uses.  Marketable instruments 
need to address explicitly two challenges: spatial heterogeneity in habitat quality and the 
poor correlation between land valued low for development but high for conservation.   
Herein we examined two institutions that address these challenges—tradable set-
aside requirements (TSARs), and TSARs combined with an agglomeration bonus, 
relative to the benchmark case of command and control.  Compared across cost 
efficiency, biological efficiency, economic efficiency, and spatial efficiency, the results 
suggest TSARs can work given asymmetric landowners, habitat quality connectivity, 
high correlation between low cost land, and an opportunity set for conservation that 
includes millions of possible combinations of 20 conserved parcels.  Combining TSARs 
with an agglomeration bonus improves habitat connectivity but at a greater cost.   
  
                                                 
9
 The spatial correlation of low cost land is primarily responsible for this result.  It remains an open 
question as to whether a more dispersed spatial distribution of low production valued parcels would 
maintain the no difference result in hitting the spatial target.     
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Independent Samples    
  
NT 
 
TO 
 
TAB 
 
CE 
1.28 
(0.00) 
55 
1.12 
(0.096) 
23 
1.13 
(0.073) 
24 
 
BE 
 
0.38 
(0.102) 
58 
0.72 
(0.149) 
32 
0.84 
(0.073) 
39 
 
EE 
 
1 
(0.00) 
55 
0.67 
(0.224) 
38 
0.84 
(0.086) 
25 
 
SE 
 
 0.71 
(0.227) 
13 
0.63 
(0.199) 
28 
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Figure 1.  The 10x10 Experimental Land Grid 
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Figure 2.  Illustrative Example—No Subsidy 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 
Round 9 Round 10 Round 11 Round 12 
Round 13 Round 14 Round 15 Round 16 
Round 17 Round 18 Round 19 Round 20 
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Figure 3.  Illustrative Example—TSARs 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 
Round 9 Round 10 Round 11 Round 12 
Round 13 Round 14 Round 15 Round 16 
Round 17 Round 18 Round 19 Round 20 
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Figure 4.  Illustrative Example—TSARs w/Agglomeration Bonus 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 
Round 9 Round 10 Round 11 Round 12 
Round 13 Round 14 Round 15 Round 16 
Round 17 Round 18 Round 19 Round 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
